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COMMENTS
ARE ATTACHMENTS ON CONTRACTS LIMITED
TO THOSE FOR THE DIRECT PAYMENT OF MONEY?
By JACK D. FUDGE*
IN Noxan Construction Co. v. Wallace Process Piping Co.,' the Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeal affirmed an order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles denying a motion to dissolve an attachment secured
by the plaintiff under Subdivision 1, Section 537, Code of Civil Proce-
dure.2 The plaintiff was a general contractor of the United States for
the construction of a building at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Lompoc,
California. As general contractor, the plaintiff had entered into a
subcontract with the defendant whereby the defendant was to furnish,
at his own expense, all labor, material and proper supervision necessary
to install all mechanical works as specified in the contract. In addition,
the defendant was to perform all work free from mechanics' liens and,
if requested, was to furnish a waiver of lien from every person fur-
nishing labor or materials to the defendant for any work done or
materials furnished. In the event any liens or claims of lien were
asserted, the defendant was to indemnify the plaintiff for any obliga-
tion or liability he might suffer from the assertion of such lien. Finally,
should the defendant fail to perform the work as specified, the plaintiff
could at his election have the work completed and the defendant agreed
to pay any excess over and above the price specified. For his perform-
ance, the defendant was to receive $156,400 to be paid in monthly
installments with a lump sum payment upon completion to the plain-
tiff's satisfaction.
In an action for breach of contract the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant failed to complete the work as specified and that the cost of
* Member, second year class.
191 Cal. App. 2d 651, 13 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1961).
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537: "The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons, or at
any time afterward may have the property of the defendant attached, as security for the sat-
isfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, unless the defendant gives security to pay
such judgment, as in this chapter provided, in the following cases:
1. In an action upon a contract, express or implied, for the direct payment of money,
where the contract is made or is payable in this State and is not secured by any mortgages,
deed of trust or lien upon real or personal property, or any pledge of personal property, or,
if originally so secured, such security has . . . become valueless.
[38]
completion was $3,000. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant
failed to perform the work free from mechanics' liens; but that on the
contrary, numerous liens and claims of lien had been asserted for which
the plaintiff claimed damages of $19,966.02.
A writ of attachment was issued upon the basis of the complaint.
The defendant resisted the writ arguing that the complaint did not state
facts showing a breach of contract for the "direct payment of money"
as required by the code, and therefore attachment was not proper. The
crux of the defendant's argument hinged upon the judicial interpre-
tation of the phrase, "direct payment of money," enacted in Subdivi-
sion 1 of Section 537 of the Code of Civil Procedure.3
The court, in ruling on the defendant's motion, saw fit to consider
only the alleged failure properly to complete the work called for and
deemed it unnecessary to consider the failure to perform the work free
from mechanics' liens on the grounds that the motion was to set the
attachment aside in its entirety.' However, in so ruling, the court seems
to have failed to give consideration to Section 540 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, requiring that the amount of the writ must be stated in
conformity with the complaint.5 This section must be read in conjunc-
tion with Section 538 of the Code of Civil Procedure6 requiring the
plaintiff to submit an affidavit showing the amount of indebtedness which
is supported by an attachable cause of action. In Finch v. McVean the
court construed this section to require that:"
The clerk before issuing the writ must see that the affidavit complies
with the provisions of the statute and the indebtedness therein stated,
and so qualified, is supported by the statement in the complaint of an
attachable cause of action for the direct payment of money in an
amount equal to or greater than the amount stated in the affidavit.
'Ibid.
'191 Cal. App. 2d at 656-57, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 30: "Although the line which divides the
cases in which an attachment will or will not lie is obviously difficult to draw with certainty,
at least one breach alleged therein falls well within the limits expressed by the above cited
cases. With respect to the alleged failure to complete.... Since this claim provides a basis
for attachment there is no need to consider the others, because the motion denied by the
trial court sought to set aside the attachment in its entirety...."
6 CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc.-§ 540: "The writ must be directed to the sheriff, or a constable or
marshal of any county in which property of such defendant may be ... or so much of the
property of such defendant as may he sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand against such
defendant, the amount of which must be stated in conformity with the complaint.. .. "
'CAL. CODE Crv. Paoc. § 538 which provides: "The clerk of the court . . . must issue
the writ of attachment upon receiving an affidavit by or on behalf of the plaintiff showing:
1. The facts specified in Section 537 which entitle him to the writ. 2. The amount of the
indebtedness claimed over and above all legal setoffs or counterclaims, or the amount claimed
as damages...."
'6 Cal. App. 272, 275, 91 Pac. 1019, 1020 (1907).
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It may readily be seen that the complaint is controlling and that
the writ of attachment must be supported by an attachable cause of
action as specified in the complaint, regardless of the amount appearing
in the affidavit.' Therefore, if the writ of attachment is issued for an
amount shown in the affidavit which is not supported by an attachable
cause of action, the writ would be issued for an amount greater than
the attachable indebtedness stated in the affidavit. However, it is well
established law in this jurisdiction that a writ will not issue for an
amount greater than the attachable indebtedness stated in the affidavit.9
A violation of this rule of law requires a dissolution of the attachment."
A motion to dissolve the attachment would put in issue whether the
amount stated in the affidavit was supported by an attachable cause.
This in turn would require a ruling that all causes of action upon which
the affidavit was based, were for the direct payment of money. In view
of this, it would appear that the court was bound to rule on the question
of whether the defendant's agreement to indemnify against liability
arising on the asserted liens was a contract for the "direct payment of
money." The court being apparently thus bound, the effect of allowing
the attachment on the facts presented would be to render an affirmative
holding by inference as to this issue. A close analysis of the cases cited
by the court in the instant case, however, would appear to give ample
justification and authority for the extension of the code to cover this area.
Judicial Development of "Direct Payment of Money"
One of the earlier landmark decisions, relied upon in all cases cited
by the court, was Hathaway v. Davis." This action was on a contract
of surety to secure damages awarded on appeal. The court in allowing
an attachment against the surety stated it was not the legislative intent
,, . . under this section [Code of Civil Procedure Section 537] he [plaintiff] may
unite with a cause of action upon a contract for the direct payment of money another cause
of action arising out of contract, wherein the damages for its breach are unliquidated, and
for which he is not entitled to a writ of attachment .... [I]f he would have a writ of attach-
ment upon the cause of action for which it is authorized by section 537, the amount for which
he could make the affidavit required by section 538 would be the amount for which the writ
should issue and which should be stated therein. . . . He [plaintiff] did not become entitled
to a writ for this portion of the amount claimed from the defendant by uniting in his com-
plaint another cause of action for which he might have been entitled to a writ." Baldwin
v. Napa etc. Wine Co., 137 Cal. 646, 649-50, 70 Pac. 732, 733-34 (1902).
'Barceloux v. Dow, 174 Cal. App. 2d 170, 344 P.2d 41 (1959).
"0 Baldwin v. Napa etc. Wine Co., 137 Cal. 646, 70 Pac. 732 (1902); De Leonis v.
Etchepare, 120 Cal. 407, 52 Pac. 718 (1898); Murillo v. Toole, 47 Cal. App. 2d 725, 118
P.2d 895 (1941) ; Rosenberg v. Bullard, 127 Cal. App. 315, 15 P.2d 870 (1932) ; Finch v.
McVean, 6 CaL App. 272, 91 Pac. 1019 (1907).
" 33 Cal. 161 (1867).
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to exclude collateral contracts of indorsers, guarantors, and sureties,12
but by the phrase, "direct payment of money," meant to limit attach-
ment to contracts where the amount to be paid was fixed by the contract.
It should be noted that nothing was decided regarding damages arising
on a contract.
The issue of damages arose shortly thereafter in Dunn v. Mackey. 3
In an action for damages for breach of contract, an attachment was
allowed wherein the defendant bound himself to pay a specific amount
of money fixed by the contract, as required by Hathaway v. Davis. The
court, in sustaining the attachment, held that while the specific amount
recoverable as damages was dependent upon evidence to be introduced
at trial, it would not deny an attachment where the damages could be
ascertained with reasonable certainty. 4
The next significant expansion of these interpretations occurred in
1921 in Greenbaum v. Smith.'5 In this action for damages a carrier
was allowed to maintain an attachment on a contract to transport goods
wherein the specific amount payable was not stated in the contract. In
arriving at this conclusion, the court merely expanded the rule of Hath-
away v. Davis and combined it with the rule of Dunn v. Mackey. While
the specific amount payable upon performance was not fixed by the
contract, the court held that this would not bar an attachment wherein
it is ascertainable with reasonable certainty. This same reasoning, it
will be remembered, was applied to allow attachment on an action for
damages.
At this junction, it would appear that judicial interpretation of
"direct payment of money" includes collateral contracts of surety and
guaranty, an action for damages for breach of contract, and an action
wherein the amount payable is not specifically stated in the contract.
This should be qualified, however, to the extent that in each of these
" Id. at 168: "To read 'direct' as the opposite to 'collateral,' would be to create a dis-
tinction of very doubtful foundation and certainly opposed to the general policy of the Act.
To so read it would be to exempt all collateral contracts from operation of the Act. In-
dorsers, guarantors, sureties and all others who undertook to pay or become responsible for
the debts of another could not be reached by attachment; and yet there can be no good
reason why they should be excepted. We are of the opinion that the legislature intended no
such distinction."
" 80 Cal. 104, 22 Pac. 64 (1889).
1, The rationale of the court appears to be that while no case has been decided directly
on an attachment for damages for breach of contract under Code of Civil Procedure section
537(1) there is ample authority for the point that attachment in general will lie for such
damages. It cites: Drake, Attachments sections 13-23; Wilson v. Wilson, 8 Gill 192, 50
Am. Dec. 685. Therefore it logically follows that attachment will lie under section 537(1)
for damages on a contract for the direct payment of money.
1' 51 Cal. App. 692, 197 Pac. 675 (1921) ; 9 CALiF. L. Rev. 336 (1920).
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areas the party against whom the attachment has been maintained had
bound himself to pay money in the performance of the contract.
The next judicial step combined all three of these statutory interpre-
tations in one action. This was accomplished in 1947 in Eaton v.
Queen. 6 Here the plaintiff was allowed to maintain an attachment on
an action for damages on a warranty, in the sale of a tractor, to pay
cost of repairs necessary to make the tractor perform equivalent to a
new one. The court, in allowing the attachment, held that the contract
sued upon must furnish a standard from which the amount due can
be ascertained and that there must exist a basis upon which the damages
can be determined by proof.
From this line of decisions it would seem to be a justified expansion
to include a contract for indemnity within the purview of section 537 (1)
along with contracts of surety and warranty; for it is a contractual
relation within the same general category as the latter two and is often
referred to synonymously with them.'
Conclusion
While Noxon is significant for expanding the code section to encom-
pass contracts of indemnity, a much more important result could be
the destruction of any legal significance the legislature may have
intended by the insertion of the phrase, "for the direct payment of
money," into the code section.'"
In the instant case, were the clauses calling for payment of cost of
completion and indemnity from mechanics' liens eliminated, plaintiff
would be denied a writ of attachment on the theory that the defendant's
performance called for something other than the "direct payment of
money. '"" It is therefore evident that the writ of attachment was de-
pendent upon these clauses. In each instance, however, the clause was
basically an expressed statement whereby the defendant agreed to pay
the damages for breaches for which he would have been liable on the
contract.20 This fact, coupled with the implication of the instant case
that a contract of indemnity is for the "direct payment of money," leads
to the conclusion that a contract to indemnify for damages occasioned
by a breach of contract will support an attachment proceeding. How-
16 78 Cal. App. 2d 571, 77 P.2d 997 (1947).
" 26 CAL. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 4 (1956).
'" CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537(1).
19 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 51 (1954) and cases cited. See 8 CALIF. L. REV.
251 (1919).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 346 (a), (i) ; 14 CAL. JuR. 2d Damages §§ 24, 144 (1954);
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3300.
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ever, is not this merely stating expressly what the law implies? 2' Should
not the courts, then, discard this distinction and allow an attachment
for breach of any contract where the damages are reasonably ascer-
tainable?
Judicial construction of the language, "direct payment of money,"
has always been uncertain, with the result that its only significance has
been that a contract to do something other than pay money would not
support an attachment proceeding. Apart from this limitation, the
statute has been broadly interpreted.22 In view of the decision in Noxon
v. Wallace, it would appear that this remaining limitation should no
longer be given judicial significance.
" BouVIER, LAW DicTboNARY (1897) defines damages as: "The indemnity recoverable
by a person who has sustained an injury either in his person, property, or relative rights,
through the default of another."
22 1 Wrmca, CALFoRNIA PRocEDuan § 51 at 892 (1954).
